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Abstract— A quantum key distribution system has been 
developed, using standard telecommunications optical fiber, 
which is capable of operating at clock rates of greater than 1 
GHz.  The quantum key distribution system implements a 
polarization encoded version of the B92 protocol.  The system 
employs vertical-cavity surface-emitting lasers with emission 
wavelengths of 850 nm as weak coherent light sources, and silicon 
single photon avalanche diodes as the single photon detectors.  A 
distributed feedback laser of emission wavelength 1.3 µm, and a 
linear gain germanium avalanche photodiode was used to 
optically synchronize individual photons over the standard 
telecommunications fiber.  The quantum key distribution system 
exhibited a quantum bit error rate of 1.4%, and an estimated net 
bit rate greater than 100,000 bits-1 for a 4.2 km transmission 
range.  For a 10 km fiber range a quantum bit error rate of 2.1%, 
and estimated net bit rate of greater than 7,000 bits-1 was 
achieved. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
UANTUM key distribution (QKD), first proposed by 
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1], is a means of  
distributing a verifiably secure key, between two or more users 
[2], over an unsecured channel [3].  A secure method of 
encryption – the “one-time pad” approach - was proposed in 
1917 by Gilbert Vernam, and was proven absolutely secure by 
Claude Shannon in 1949 [4].  This encryption technique relies 
on a key that is, truly random, as long as the message itself, 
and used only once.  Uniquely, QKD provides a method for 
distributing this type of key in a verifiably secure manner.  
QKD exploits the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics to 
achieve security: for example, the fact that the non-orthogonal 
polarization states of individual photons cannot be 
simultaneously measured with arbitrarily high accuracy nor 
without perturbation.  Hence, if the random key data is  
encoded and transmitted using such states secure key sharing 
can be achieved, because an eavesdropper can only ever obtain 
partial information on the key and will inevitably generate a 
detectable disturbance on the quantum communication 
channel.  Bennett and Brassard’s original QKD protocol 
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(BB84) employs two incompatible pairs of conjugate quantum 
observables, for example circular and linear-polarization 
states, to encode the data [1].  In Bennett's simpler B92 
protocol two non-orthogonal states are utilized, for example 
two non-orthogonal linear-polarization states [3]. 
 To date, many groups have demonstrated the possibility of 
free-space [5]-[8] and optical fiber-based QKD systems [9]-
[14].  There has been growing interest in QKD systems at 
lower operating wavelengths of ~850 nm [15]-[22] due to the 
superior performance of technologically mature silicon single 
photon avalanche diodes (SPAD's).  Silicon SPAD's exhibit 
high efficiencies at wavelengths below 1000 nm [22]-[23].  
However, they do not exhibit the deleterious effects of 
afterpulsing commonly associated with Ge and InGaAs-based 
SPAD's which are capable of high efficiency detection at 
wavelengths of greater than 1000 nm [24]-[25].  This detector 
afterpulsing phenomenon has limited the performance of fiber-
based QKD systems operating at the low-loss fiber windows of 
1.3 µm and 1.55 µm wavelength; leading to key exchange rates 
of only < 50 bits-1 at distances of > 50 km.  The fiber loss at 
850 nm wavelength (~2.2 dBkm-1) is far too high to achieve 
transmission distances of this magnitude. However, for short 
distance (~10 km) applications of QKD in, for example, 
campus- or metropolitan-scale networks short wavelength 
systems are likely to offer the highest key exchange rates due 
to the superior performance of silicon SPAD's.  Standard 
telecommunications fiber is not single-mode at a wavelength 
of 850 nm and this might be thought to prevent the 
implementation of QKD over deployed fiber networks.  
However, one of the current authors has previously 
demonstrated that mode-selective launch techniques can be 
employed to alleviate this problem [18].  The QKD system 
detailed in this paper builds on this original work, but explores 
the possibilities of faster key transmission rates and the 
implementation of different protocols.   
The so-called B92 protocol was chosen here since it is 
simpler to implement in practice than the BB84 protocol, as 
only two states are required instead of four.  The polarization 
encoded version of B92 proceeds as follows for an idealized 
system. The transmitter “Alice” and the receiver “Bob” each  
generate an independent random bit sequence. Alice then 
transmits her random bit sequence to Bob using a clocked 
sequence of linearly-polarized, individual photons with 
polarization angles chosen according to her bit values as given 
by 0° ≡ 0 and 45° ≡ 1.  In each time period Bob makes a 
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polarization measurement on an incoming photon by 
orientating the transmission axis of his polarizer according to 
his bit value as given by -45° ≡ 0 and 90° ≡ 1.  It can be seen 
that Bob will only detect a photon (with probability one half) 
in the time slots where his polarizer is not crossed with  
Alice’s. We refer to these instances as “unambiguous” since 
when they occur Alice and Bob can be sure that their 
polarization settings were not orthogonal and, consequently, 
that their bit values were the same (both 0 or both 1). 
Conversely, the instances in which Bob receives no photon are 
referred to as “ambiguous” since they can arise either from the 
cases where Alice and Bob’s polarizers were crossed or from 
the cases where the polarizers were not crossed, but Bob failed 
(with probability one half) to detect a photon. Bob then uses an 
authenticated public channel to inform Alice of the time slots 
in which he obtained an unambiguous result (one in four on 
average) and they use the shared subset of their initial random 
bit sequences represented by these time slots as a key. The 
level of intervention by an eavesdropper “Eve” can then be 
quantified in the usual way by analyzing the error rate for the 
key exchange.  
It is important to note that B92 is not as inherently secure as 
BB84, since Eve can in principle perform a potentially 
undetectable intercept-resend attack.  With this type of attack, 
Eve chooses to only resend a photon to Bob when she obtains 
an unambiguous measurement outcome and hence knows 
Alice’s polarization setting.  This would not cause any 
depolarization-induced errors in the transmission, but would 
lead to a decreased photon arrival rate that would alert Bob to 
Eve’s presence. However, if the quantum channel is lossy (as 
is the case with optical fiber) then Eve can in principle 
substitute a lower loss channel to compensate for her reduced 
photon transmission rate and hence avoid detection.  Various 
approaches have been discussed to avoid this problem 
including the use of bright reference pulses in the original 
interferometric version of B92 [3]. We mention other defenses 
further below, but also note that the QKD system described 
here can be developed to implement the BB84 protocol with 
several straightforward changes. BB84 does not suffer from 
this security deficiency since, with four polarization states, Eve 
cannot be sure that she has determined the state of any given 
photon with deterministic certainty. 
We have demonstrated a QKD system operating up to a clock 
frequency of 1 GHz over standard telecommunications fiber 
lengths of up to 15 km by implementing the B92 protocol 
using linear-polarization encoding.  Error correction and 
privacy amplification were not implemented in the work 
presented in this paper, thus the net bit rate after error 
correction and privacy amplification was estimated.  The 
quantum bit error rate (QBER), raw bit rate, and estimated net 
bit rate (NBR) after error correction and privacy amplification 
  
 
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the quantum key distribution experiment.  PBS: 
Polarization splitter.  PC: Polarization controller.  WDM: Wavelength 
division multiplexor.  APD:  Avalanche photodiode.  VCSEL: Vertical-cavity 
surface-emitting laser.  SPAD: Single photon avalanche diode.  DFB: 
Distributed feedback laser.  The arrows represent polarization states of 
individual photons propagating in the optical fiber. 
 
 for 4.2 km of fiber was 1.4%, ~300 kbits-1, and ~130 kbits-1 
respectively.  Correspondingly over 10 km of fiber, the QKD 
system demonstrated a QBER of 2.1%, raw bit rate of ~18 
kbits-1, and a NBR of ~7 kbits-1.  However, the NBR drops 
rapidly above 10 km due to the relatively high level of fiber 
loss.  To the best of our knowledge, the work described in this 
paper represents the highest net bit transmission rate for any 
demonstration QKD system.  
  
 
II. EXPERIMENTAL 
A. Quantum key distribution system design 
The characterized QKD system is shown in Fig. 1.  The 
QKD system is entirely fiber-based, and an interchangeable 
length of standard telecommunications fiber separates Alice 
and Bob, the transmitter and receiver respectively.  For 
characterization purposes, a non-return to zero (NRZ) pseudo-
random bit sequence or a programmable bit stream was used to 
drive the laser source.  Two 850 nm wavelength vertical-cavity 
surface-emitting lasers (VCSEL's) are used to implement the 
B92 protocol.  In the case of the BB84 protocol, four VCSEL's 
could be used to implement the protocol, or one VCSEL could 
be used in conjunction with a suitable polarization modulator 
[26].  The light emitted from the VCSEL's is linearly-polarized 
and spatially and spectrally single mode when driven under the 
correct conditions.  These VCSEL's typically exhibit a spectral 
line-width of ~0.1 nm under high-speed modulation, and are 
temperature tuned to have identical wavelengths, in order to 
avoid spectral interrogation by an eavesdropper.  The 
VCSEL's were driven over a frequency range of 100 MHz to 2 
GHz.  A mean photon number (µ) of 0.1 photons per pulse was 
used for all experiments, meaning that the photon transmission 
rate from Alice varied between 10 Mbits-1 and 200 Mbits-1 
depending on the chosen clock frequency. 
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The polarized light from each VCSEL was launched into 5.5 
µm core diameter optical fiber, which was single mode at a 
wavelength of 850 nm.  Both Alice and Bob utilized 850 nm 
single mode fiber, but were separated by an interchangeable 
length of standard telecommunications fiber.  The standard 
telecommunications fiber supported more than one mode at an 
operating wavelength of 850nm.  However, when a length of 
standard telecommunications fiber is fusion spliced to a fiber 
of smaller core diameter then the fundamental mode is excited 
and the second order modes are greatly suppressed.  Thus, 
only one stable spatial mode propagates in the fiber at all times 
[18].  This method ensures that no significant temporal 
spreading or depolarization of the optical pulses due to modal 
dispersion occurs, even at Gbits-1 clock frequencies. 
The polarized light from each VCSEL once launched into 
the separate 5.5 µm core diameter single mode fibers are 
manipulated using fiber polarization controllers.  The linear-
polarization can be manipulated into two non-orthogonal 
polarization states (as required for the B92 protocol) at an 
angle of 45° with respect to each other as illustrated by the 
arrows in fig. 1.  The VCSEL's are arranged so that one 
VCSEL represents a "0" and the other represents a "1".  The 
non-orthogonal polarization states are combined by a 
polarization independent 50:50 coupler, and attenuated to a 
mean number of 0.1 photons per laser pulse (µ) using a 
programmable attenuator. 
A distributed feedback (DFB) laser of emission wavelength 
1.3 µm was used to optically clock and time-stamp the 
individual photons transmitted to Bob.  The DFB laser was 
driven at a sub-multiple of the clock frequency denoted as the 
synchronization frequency.  Where, the clock frequency was 
the driving frequency of the VCSEL's. 
A germanium avalanche photodiode (APD) biased ~1 V 
below avalanche breakdown (in the linear multiplication 
regime) was used to detect the optical synchronization pulse 
and convert it into an electrical signal.  Cross-talk of the 1.3 
µm wavelength light into the 850 nm wavelength channel was 
reduced to the required level using a high-finesse band-pass 
filter centered at 850 nm. 
The dual polarization states arriving at Bob after propagating 
through X km of standard telecommunications fiber, are 
manipulated to enable 25% of the transmitted data to be 
measured unambiguously.  This is achieved by using two fiber 
based polarizing beam splitters (PBS's) and two silicon 
SPAD's.  Since the driving signal of the VCSEL's was NRZ, 
the unambiguous data could not be recombined with a delay in 
one of the fiber channels and measured using only one SPAD, 
as described in other work [9], [11], [18].  We will denote the 
fiber channel from which the unambiguous "0's" are measured 
as channel 0, and correspondingly the channel from which the 
unambiguous "1's" are measured as channel 1. 
Note that there are two other fiber ports from the polarizing 
beam splitters indicated in fig. 1 by a “?”.  These ports indicate 
the two fiber channels that contain the remaining 75% of the 
ambiguous data.  The photons in these ports could be 
measured using another two SPAD's, and the collected data 
could be analyzed statistically to detect the presence of an 
eavesdropper [27].  An optimal method of unambiguously  
sifting the data transmitted by Alice could be employed, and 
was proposed in [28].  This optimal method yields ~29% of 
the photons incident at Bob's receiver to be measured 
unambiguously using a non-orthogonal separation angle of 
45°.  However, for the purposes of these characterization 
measurements a simpler method of using only two polarizing 
beam splitters is employed. 
The silicon SPAD's used in these characterization 
experiments were Perkin Elmer SPCM-AQR-12's.  These 
SPAD's were used in conjunction with a time-correlated 
photon-counting acquisition card and a personal computer to 
collect the transmitted data.  These particular Si SPAD's had a 
detection efficiency of ~40% at the operating wavelength of 
850 nm, and a dark count rate of ~180 counts-1 each.  These Si 
SPAD's typically have a jitter of between 300 and 400 ps. 
In this configuration the QKD system had typical system 
insertion losses of ~17.0 dB.  This loss includes the 75% loss 
caused by the unambiguous bit filtering technique at the PBS's 
and the ~40% detection efficiency of the Si SPAD's.  
However, this system loss does not include the extra 
transmission fiber losses of ~2.2 dBkm-1.  Several lengths of 
fiber were used to characterize the QBER and the NBR of the 
QKD system.  When a required fiber length was not readily 
available, extra attenuation could be added using the attenuator 
in order to simulate the losses induced by a specific length of 
standard telecommunications fiber.  This method has been 
shown to generate realistic measurement results in [11] and is 
generally applicable as long as there is no significant pulse 
spreading or pulse depolarization due to chromatic dispersion 
or polarization mode dispersion in the fiber.  In this paper we 
show that the simulated fiber attenuation measurements 
correlate closely with measurements taken using actual lengths 
of standard telecommunications fiber in both QBER and NBR 
analyses. 
In any communication system based on standard fiber the 
polarization state of the light at the receiver can drift with time 
due to thermally- or mechanically-induced variations in the 
fiber birefringence.  Clearly this is an important issue for a 
polarization-encoded QKD system since the transmitter and 
receiver must establish and maintain a shared polarization 
reference in order to implement key sharing. Fortunately, in 
most deployed fiber systems this polarization drift is relatively 
slow and can in principle be compensated by means of 
automated polarization controllers (albeit at extra cost). In the 
current work measurements were taken over a relatively short 
time, typically between 60 seconds and 600 seconds, so the 
effects of polarization drift were minimized.  In the future it 
would be desirable to integrate automated polarization 
controllers into the QKD system, in order to improve the 
stability and hence the practicality of the system. 
 
B. Data collection 
The QKD test system described within this paper is under 
development, with no eavesdropper test, error correction, or 
privacy amplification.  In order to characterize the QKD 
system a Becker & Hickl SPC-600 photon counting card was 
used to collect a series of repetitive data, using either, a pre- 
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Fig. 2.  A histogram collected over 60 seconds using the SPC-600 photon 
counting card in oscilloscope mode.  The data was measured from channel 0, 
over a standard telecommunications fiber length of 11.07 km, using a 
repetitive 8-bit word of 10101010 at a clock frequency of 1 GHz. 
 
determined 8-bit repetitive word (10101010), or a 215 - 1 
(32,767) repetitive pseudo-random bit sequence.  The data was 
collected in the form of a histogram of collected counts from 
each SPAD over a specific collection time (T), typically 60 
seconds in the case of the 8-bit word, and 600 seconds in the 
case of the pseudo-random bit-sequence.  An example of a 
recorded histogram is shown in fig. 2. 
The upper limit of the synchronization input of the SPC-600 
photon counting card was 200 MHz.  Thus, the 
synchronization frequency was a sub-multiple of the laser 
clock frequency in order for the synchronization frequency to 
be less than 200 MHz.  The synchronization frequency was 
1/16th of the clock frequency in the case of a repetitive 8-bit 
word, and 1/(16 × (215 - 1))th in the case of the pseudo-random 
bit-sequence. 
For example, in the case of the repetitive 8-bit word, when 
operating at a clock frequency of 100 MHz, corresponding to a 
bit width (laser pulse width) of 10 ns, the synchronization 
frequency was divided to 6.25 MHz.  Correspondingly, a clock 
frequency of 1 GHz, with a bit width of 1 ns, produced a 
synchronization frequency of 62.5 MHz.  In the case of the 
pseudo-random bit-sequence, measurements were only taken at 
a clock frequency of 1 GHz with a corresponding 
synchronization frequency of 1.9 kHz. 
In an installed QKD system operating at these data rates, the 
output from both SPAD's would be simultaneously collected 
and stored in the memory of the personal computer with the 
exact arrival time of each photon.  This provides the 
information required by Alice and Bob in their post-
transmission discussion for the discard of the irrelevant bits, 
and the subsequent eavesdropper test (QBER), error correction 
and privacy amplification.  The volume of data required for 
accurate system characterization made this method difficult to 
implement, hence the technique of system analysis using 
repetitive input signals was adopted for the measurements 
described in this paper.  Since the data transmitted between 
Alice and Bob is synchronized, Bob can choose to disregard 
photons that do not arrive in a specific time window (∆t) with 
respect to the synchronization pulse.  For example, for a clock 
frequency of 1 GHz and bit width of 1 ns, Bob can choose to 
only accept photon counts which occur in a window ∆t = 50% 
  
 
Fig. 3.  Diagram illustrating each time period ∆t in which Bob accepts his the 
collected data, where tc is the center of each bit-period time window.  ∆t can 
vary from 1% to 100% of the bit-width 
 
of the bit width, i.e. 0.5 ns.  Since data at the change between 
each bit period introduces further error due to the temporal 
response of the each VCSEL and each SPAD.  This process 
has been illustrated in fig. 3, where five bit periods are 
illustrated for channel 1 for a bit sequence of 01101.  In this 
instance Bob accepts all of the data that is collected in the 
specific time intervals ∆t and disregards any counts outside 
these time periods.  Bob can calculate when a detected count 
from a SPAD was outside the time window ∆t by referring to 
the synchronization pulse, giving the arrival time of each 
photon.  From the collected data we can ascertain the QBER, 
raw bit rate, sifted bit rate, and estimate the net bit rate, which 
are defined in sections C and D. 
 
C. Raw bit rate, sifted bit rate and net bit rate 
The raw bit rate per second for this QKD system can be 
defined as, 
 
nnR fsraw =  (1) 
 
Where ns is the system loss of the QKD system including 
the insertion losses at the polarizing beam splitters and 
detection efficiency of the SPAD's, ns was approximately 17.0 
dB.  nf is the transfer loss of the standard telecommunications 
fiber which is dependent on the length of fiber used, which has 
a loss of ~2.2 dBkm-1 at a transmission wavelength of 850 nm.  
µ is the mean photon number per laser pulse, which was set to 
0.1 photons per pulse for all measurements described in this 
paper.  ν is the clock frequency of the system, i.e. the VCSEL 
driving frequency, where ν could be set to any frequency 
between 100 MHz and 2 GHz. 
The sifted bit rate per second for this system will be defined 
as the proportion of the raw bit rate accepted by Bob in each 
time interval ∆t.  This sifted bit rate includes correct and 
incorrect counts, which are used to calculate the QBER, and 
the NBR.  Hence, the sifted bit rate is dependent on Bob's 
chosen value of ∆t. 
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Where R(∆t)raw is the sum of raw counts in one time interval 
∆t averaged over one second, and summed over all bit periods 
giving R(∆t)sift.  R(∆t)sift is the bit rate per second prior to error 
correction and privacy amplification. 
The NBR (R(∆t)net) per second after error correction and 
privacy amplification can be approximated using (3) [10], 
[29], [30]. 
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Where Q is the QBER, which is dependent on ∆t, and IAE is 
the amount of information an eavesdropper could gain.   
 
cos1IAE(max) −=  (4) 
 
For these approximations, we assume the worst case 
scenario, i.e. that the maximum unambiguous information is 
attained by an eavesdropper.  Where θ is the angle between the 
non-orthogonal polarization states, thus when θ = 45° then the 
maximum information gain by an eavesdropper is 
approximately 29% [28], as shown in (4).  Assuming the 
maximum information gain by an eavesdropper means the 
approximated value of Rnet is at its minimum value.  R(∆t)net is 
dependent on the QBER and R(∆t)sift, which is dependent on 
Bob's chosen value of ∆t. 
 
D. Quantum bit error rate 
The QBER is the ratio of the total number of incorrect counts 
i.e. measuring a 0 instead of a 1 expressed as a percentage of 
the total number of correct and incorrect counts (R(∆t)sift) (5).  
Three main factors contribute towards the detected incorrect 
counts.  (i) The dark count rate of the SPAD's.  (ii) 
Polarization leakage caused by the imperfect polarization 
extinction ratio of the PBS's.  (iii) A combination of the 
temporal response of the VCSEL's and the SPAD's which can 
cause a count to be detected in the incorrect time window.  At 
longer fiber transmission lengths, chromatic dispersion will 
also cause temporal broadening of the detected pulse shape, in 
turn adversely affecting the QBER.  At a wavelength of 850 
nm temporal broadening due to chromatic dispersion is ~100 
ps/nm.km in standard telecommunications fiber.  The spectral 
line-width of the VCSEL's under high-speed modulation is ≤ 
0.1 nm, hence over 10 km of fiber the temporal broadening of 
the pulse due to chromatic dispersion is ≤ 100 ps.  The VCSEL 
laser pulse width at a clock frequency of 1 GHz is 1 ns and the 
temporal response of the Si SPAD's is ~350 ps.  Hence, the 
detectable error contribution from chromatic dispersion at 
longer fiber lengths is low.  However, at frequencies greater 
than 1 GHz, and SPAD's with a temporal response << 300 ps 
the  error  due  to  chromatic   dispersion   will   have   a   more 
 
 
Fig. 4.  A logarithmic graph showing the Rraw versus fiber length for the clock 
frequencies of 100 MHz and 1 GHz, and µ = 0.1 photons per pulse.  Where 
the simulated points are fiber lengths simulated using extra attenuation. 
 
pronounced effect on the QBER.  The QBER in simple terms 
is defined in (5). 
 
incorrectcorrect
incorrect
CC
CQBER
+
=  (5) 
 
Where Ccorrect, is the number of correct counts, and Cincorrect 
is the number of incorrect counts per unit of time.  For this 
QKD system the QBER calculation is defined as:   
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )

==
=
+
= N
1n
incorrect
N
1n
correct
N
1n
incorrect
tCtC
tC
tQBER  (6) 
 
Where C(∆t)incorrect is the number of incorrect counts in the 
time period ∆t, summed over all bit periods N in which a 
photon should not be detected in either channel 0 and 1.  
Correspondingly C(∆t)correct, is the number of correct counts in 
the time period ∆t, summed over all bit periods N in which a 
photon is correctly detected.  Where ∆t is a pre-determined 
percentage of the bit period time window.  For example at 1 
GHz the bit period is 1 ns, therefore a ∆t = 50% (0.5 ns) could 
be chosen by Bob as valid data and anything outside this time 
period is discarded.    
In order to characterize the QKD system, repetitive data 
from the VCSEL's was collected for a pre-determined period 
of time.  The photon count distributions were then analyzed to 
ascertain the QBER, sifted bit rate and to estimate NBR for 
specific lengths of fiber.  The raw bit rate was measured by 
either using the SPC-600 photon counting card or a photon 
counter, which counts the number of detected counts in a 
specified time interval. 
The QBER of the QKD system has three main contributing 
factors as discussed earlier, these can be expressed as, 
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Fig. 5.  A logarithmic graph showing the QBER versus fiber length for the 
clock frequencies of 100 MHz and 1 GHz.  As in Fig. 4 the points taken with 
actual lengths of standard telecommunications fiber are highlighted in white.  
 
TABLE I 
RAW BIT RATE, SIFTED BIT RATE, NET BIT RATE, AND QUANTUM BIT ERROR 
RATE AT A CLOCK FREQUENCY OF 100 MHZ. 
 
 
Distance 
(km) 
  
Rraw 
(bits-1) 
Rsift  
(bits-1) 
∆t=5ns 
Rsift  
(bits-1) 
∆t=9ns 
Rnet  
(bits-1) 
∆t=5ns 
Rnet  
(bits-1) 
∆t=9ns 
QBER 
(%) 
∆t=5ns 
QBER 
(%) 
∆t=9ns 
0 119,257 61,948 117,698 41,147 77,671 0.4 0.4 
2.15 39,450 20,419 38,675 12,930 24,329 0.7 0.8 
3.75 16,298 8,569 15,839 4,971 9,073 1.4 1.5 
4.19 15,122 7,805 14,807 4,583 8,639 1.3 1.4 
6.16 5,595 2,882 5,361 1,357 2,505 3.0 3.0 
8.08 2,401 1,220 2,192 293 520 6.9 7.0 
9.96 1,109 554 917 / / 15.6 15.7 
11.07 990 493 717 / / 24.3 28.4 
11.85 611 291 425 / / 31.8 32.3 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )sift
darkleak
tR
tRtRtR
tQBER ++= . (7) 
 
Where R(∆t)leak is the contribution to the error due to the 
incorrect counts in each SPAD channel in each time window, 
∆t, caused by polarization leakage of the incorrect polarization 
state at each polarizing beam splitter.  R(∆t)dark is the error 
component  caused  by  the  incorrect  counts  in   each   SPAD 
channel in each time window, ∆t, caused by the dark counts 
generated by each SPAD.  Dark counts are caused by 
thermally generated carriers initiating an avalanche, which is 
registered as a false event.  Such false events can also be 
caused by after-pulsing caused by carriers being released from 
trap centers some time after an avalanche event, however these 
effects are generally less evident in state-of-the-art silicon 
SPAD's operated near room temperature.  R(∆t)ν are the 
photon counts contributing to the error caused by the temporal 
response of both the VCSEL's and the SPAD's.  This error 
contribution is low at lower frequencies such as 100 MHz, 
however R(∆t)ν increases rapidly as ν is increased from 100 
MHz to 2 GHz. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  A logarithmic graph showing the NBR versus fiber length for the 
clock frequencies of 100 MHz and 1 GHz.  As in Fig. 4 the points taken with 
actual lengths of standard telecommunications fiber are highlighted in white. 
 
TABLE II 
RAW BIT RATE, SIFTED BIT RATE, NET BIT RATE, AND QUANTUM BIT ERROR 
RATE AT A CLOCK FREQUENCY OF 1 GHZ. 
 
 
Distance 
(km) 
 
Rraw 
(bits-1) 
Rsift  
(bits-1) 
∆t=0.5ns 
Rsift  
(bits-1) 
∆t=0.98ns 
Rnet  
(bits-1) 
∆t=0.5ns 
Rnet 
(bits-1) 
∆t=0.98ns 
QBER 
(%) 
∆t=0.5ns 
QBER 
(%) 
∆t=0.98ns 
0.00 1,415,588 1,011,117 1,409,336 570,123 465,665 1.6 5.3 
2.15 856,095 623,867 853,987 360,616 311,190 1.4 4.7 
3.75 354,372 260,216 353,866 147,660 126,302 1.6 4.8 
4.19 307,738 228,251 307,103 132,350 116,868 1.4 4.4 
6.16 112,844 84,237 112,565 48,366 42,799 1.5 4.4 
8.08 43,282 32,299 43,128 18,076 15,824 1.7 4.7 
9.96 18,278 13,363 18,174 7,111 6,062 2.1 5.2 
11.07 16,277 8,502 11,679 4,073 3,045 2.8 6.6 
11.85 7,231 5,223 7,145 2,494 1,908 2.9 6.4 
13.15 3,494 2,467 3,429 882 432 4.8 9.2 
15.45 1,317 865 1,265 53 / 10.6 15.8 
17.20 725 435 682 / / 18.4 24.3 
 
E. Experimental results at 100 MHz and 1 GHz using a 
repetitive 8-bit word 
In this section, we report a selection of results taken at the 
clock frequencies of 100 MHz and 1 GHz using an 8-bit 
repetitive bit sequence of 10101010 to drive the VCSEL's.  
We report the raw bit rate, sifted bit rate, net bit rate, and 
QBER measured for both clock frequencies.  Fig. 4 shows Rraw 
plotted against fiber length for the clock frequencies of 100 
MHz and 1 GHz.  Rraw is the same whether the driving signal 
is  an  8-bit  repetitive  bit-sequence or a 215 -1 pseudo-random 
bit sequence.  Rsift, Rnet, and QBER are dependent on the value 
of ∆t chosen by Bob.  For 100 MHz two values of ∆t were 
chosen 50% and 90%, 5 ns and 9 ns respectively, where the bit 
width was 10 ns.  At 1 GHz two values of ∆t were chosen, 
50%, and 98%, giving 0.5 ns, and 0.98 ns respectively, where 
the bit width was 1 ns.  In fact, many values of ∆t were 
calculated for 1 GHz, but only two are shown for clarity.  The 
values obtained experimentally at 100 MHz and 1 GHz are 
shown in Table I and Table II respectively.  Fig. 5 shows a 
plot of the QBER expressed as a percentage versus fiber 
length, and Fig. 6 shows a plot of the estimated NBR versus 
fiber length, for both 100 MHz and 1 GHz clock frequencies. 
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Fig. 7.  Collected data for channel 0, taken over 600 seconds, showing the 
first 20 bits of the 127 bits of the 215 - 1 pseudo-random bit-sequence 
collected and analyzed for a fiber length of 3.75 km. 
 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON QUANTUM BIT ERROR RATE AT A CLOCK FREQUENCY OF 1 GHZ 
FOR AN 8-BIT REPETITIVE WORD 10101010 AND A 127-BIT PSEUDO-RANDOM 
BIT SEQUENCE. 
 
 0 km 3.75 km 6.01 km 
Pseudo (∆t=0.5ns) 2.7 1.6 3.0 
8-bit word (∆t=0.5ns) 1.6 1.6 1.5 
Pseudo (∆t=0.98ns) 5.1 3.8 6.3 
8-bit word (∆t=0.98ns) 5.3 4.8 4.4 
 
At 100 MHz the bit rate is 1/10th of that at 1 GHz.  Hence, 
the QBER reaches insecure levels at shorter distances because 
the number of received photons from Alice is correspondingly 
less, in turn increasing the QBER according to equation (7).  
However, at 1 GHz there is a larger QBER at shorter distances 
(i.e. < 3 km) due to the error contribution of R(∆t)ν.  This is 
due to the relatively slower temporal response of the VCSEL's 
and SPAD's with respect to the bit period, causing the 
detection of arriving photons to spread into adjacent time 
windows.  This static offset error at 1 GHz can be reduced 
further by reducing ∆t below 0.5 ns, however this will also 
reduce the NBR.  It was found that the optimal value of ∆t, by 
varying ∆t between 0.1 ns and 0.98 ns at 1 GHz, was ~0.5 ns, 
giving the optimal combination of QBER and NBR.  If ∆t is 
greater than 0.5 ns, the QBER is higher resulting in more data 
being discarded in the error correction and privacy 
amplification estimation, which results in a lower NBR.  
Conversely, if ∆t is less than 0.5 ns then the reduction in 
QBER does not outweigh the reduction in NBR, causing a 
significant reduction in NBR. 
At a clock frequency of 100 MHz there is little difference 
between ∆t = 5 ns and 9 ns for a clock frequency of 100 MHz.  
This is due to relatively low temporal spreading of the detected 
pulses with respect to the bit width, from the response of both 
the VCSEL's and SPAD's.  Hence, the QBER results for ∆t = 5 
ns and 9 ns at 100 MHz are very similar. 
 
F. Experimental results at 1 GHz using a repetitive 215 - 1 
pseudo-random bit-sequence  
The results discussed in section E only give an approximation 
of the QKD system performance since the collected data 
stream was a repetitive 8-bit sequence of 10101010, and not a 
random bit sequence.  Therefore, a more realistic  approach  in 
  
 
 
Fig. 8.  Collected data for channel 1, taken over 600 seconds, showing the 
first 20 bits of the 127 bits of the 215 - 1 pseudo-random bit-sequence 
collected and analyzed for a fiber length of 3.75 km. 
 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON NET BIT RATE AT A CLOCK FREQUENCY OF 1 GHZ FOR AN 8-BIT 
REPETITIVE WORD 10101010 AND A 127-BIT PSEUDO-RANDOM BIT SEQUENCE. 
 
 0 km 3.75 km 6.01 km 
Pseudo (∆t=0.5ns) 359,632 101,428 29,693 
8-bit word (∆t=0.5ns) 570,123 147,660 48,366 
Pseudo (∆t=0.98ns) 474,129 139,432 31,653 
8-bit word (∆t=0.98ns) 465,665 126,302 42,799 
 
characterizing the QKD system is to drive the VCSEL's with 
the pseudo-random bit-sequence discussed earlier.  Due to the 
nature of the data collection method, 26 – 1  bits of the pseudo-
random bit sequence were collected using the SPC-600 photon 
counting card and then analyzed.  Since 26 - 1 is only a small 
percentage of the 215 - 1 bit-sequence, the number of counts 
collected by the photon counting card in this time was very 
low in comparison to the data collection method described in 
section E.  Consequently, the data necessarily had to be 
collected for 600 seconds. 
The pseudo-random measurements were taken at 0 km and 
over two lengths of fiber, 3.75 km, and 6.01 km.  The resultant 
values of QBER and Rnet are compared in Table III and Table 
IV to the collected values for the repetitive 8-bit word given in 
section E.  Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 give an example of a section of the 
complementary histograms, for a fiber length of 3.75 km.  
Both figures show the first 20 bits of the 127-bit sequence 
collected and analyzed.  In this instance, the first twenty bits of 
the sequence were 01100,10111,01110,11101 and the border 
between each bit period is indicated by the dashed x-axis 
gridlines. 
As discussed previously the pseudo-random measurements 
were collected for a period of 600 seconds, and since 
automated polarization controllers were not employed, the 
polarization within the fiber was subject to some polarization 
drift within the collection time.  Consequently, there are some 
differences between measurements taken with a repetitive 
signal for which the collection time was 60 seconds, and the 
pseudo-random bit-sequence, as observed in Table III and 
Table IV.  At fiber lengths greater than 6 km the number of 
collected counts in 600 seconds was too low to make an 
accurate estimation of the QBER and in turn the net bit rate.  
This was due to the collection method of the data, limiting the 
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number of possible measurements using the pseudo-random bit 
sequence. 
By comparing Fig. 2, Fig. 7, and Fig. 8, it is clear that there 
are differences between the collection methods described in 
sections E and F.  In fact, the pseudo-random measurements 
give a better estimation of the NBR than using the 8 bit 
repetitive bit-sequence.  More bits of data are discarded by 
Bob in the post-transmission data processing when a pseudo-
random sequence compared to the 8-bit repetitive signal, when 
using the same value of ∆t.  The driving signal of the VCSEL's 
is NRZ.  Therefore when one VCSEL is lasing for several bit 
periods at a time, i.e. several sequential 0's or 1's, then the 
probability distribution of detected photons has an average 
height in each bit period until the bit value changes.  This is 
assuming of course that the laser pulse has a constant height 
until is driven below threshold current.  This effect can be 
observed in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.  Thus, when Bob uses a small 
∆t, for example 50%, and a random bit sequence he discards 
many useful photon counts between each ∆t.  This does not 
occur when collecting data using the 8-bit 10101010 method 
as more photons are statistically in the center of each peak 
(center of the period ∆t).  Hence, the 8-bit 10101010 method 
gives a high estimation of the sifted bit rate and NBR in 
comparison to the pseudo-random method.  This difference is 
more applicable to smaller values of ∆t, such as 0.5 ns, as is 
observed in Table IV.  However, as ∆t increases towards the 
full bit width, the sifted bit rate and estimated NBR calculated 
using both methods converge since only a very small 
percentage of the data is discarded in each case, see Table IV. 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper discusses a prototype quantum cryptography 
system, which has been used to demonstrate the feasibility of 
high bit rate QKD over standard telecommunications fiber at 
an operating wavelength of 850 nm.  The experimental system 
is capable of operation at GHz clock rates, in order to exploit 
the high potential bit rate performance of silicon SPADs, and 
employs mode-selective launch techniques to prevent modal 
instabilities or dispersion in the fiber.  We believe that this 
approach currently offers the highest potential key distribution 
rates for short distance (~10 km) applications of QKD in, for 
example, campus- or metropolitan-scale networks.  The net bit 
rate obtained from the experimental system after error 
correction and privacy amplification was estimated to be 
greater than 0.5 Mbits-1 for 0 km, 100 kbits-1 for 4.2 km, and 7 
kbits-1 for 10 km of standard telecommunications fiber.  These 
distances generated QBER's of 1.6%, 1.4%, and 2.1% 
respectively at a clock frequency of 1 GHz.  Two methods of 
data collection were used in order to characterize the QKD 
system.  It was found that both the 8-bit repetitive bit sequence 
and pseudo-random bit sequence measurements gave 
comparable QBER values.  However, it was shown that the 8-
bit repetitive bit sequence method gave slightly higher 
estimated values of NBR in comparison to the pseudo-random 
bit sequence measurements.  The pseudo-random method was 
limited by the low number of collected counts using this data 
collection method. 
Data communications VCSEL's capable of operating at 
greater than 1 GHz performance, and silicon SPAD's with a 
jitter of much less than 300 ps, are currently under 
investigation in order to improve the performance of the 
reported QKD system.  Preliminary indications are that these 
improved components will enable the system to operate at 
clock frequencies of greater than 1 GHz with an improved 
QBER and estimated net bit rate, thus realizing the potential of 
net bit rates greater than Mbits-1 over local area networks 
(LAN's) of a few kilometers. 
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